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Abstract
In this article, we identify Brexit as a critical process, wherein the EU has had the opportunity to reflect on and reinforce its
identity, as a promoter of gender issues within the security domain. It draws on this identity from a foundational myth of
the EU as gender equality polity, resulting in the creation of a socio-legal order and sustained discourse on gender inclusiv-
ity in all policy areas. Existing scholarship has drawn attention to the EU’s particular success in gender equality promotion
in the areas of social inclusion at member state level, including in the UK. But, is the EU’s reach comprehensive beyond
this policy sphere?We examine the ways in which gender is manifested in the area of foreign policy, an area where the UK
has consistently shown some leadership on the integration of gender perspectives in its foreign policy through its interna-
tional development programmes and the implementation of theWomen, Peace and Security agenda. It is therefore timely
to consider what impact Brexit has on EU policies, practices and the promotion of gender equality in this policy domain.
Using a critical feminist lens, this article looks at the evolution of gender equality as a dimension of EU foreign and security
policy in the context of EU–UK relations, and the divergences, opportunities and constraints that are crystallised by the
Brexit process.
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1. Introduction
A significant body of literature has emerged examining
the impact of the UK’s departure from the EU on gender
equality. This has highlighted the deeply gendered na-
ture of both current debates and the Brexit process itself.
This has found Brexit to be reflective of the continued
marginalisation of women as political actors, especially
as experts and commentators (Galpin, 2018), and in aca-
demic debates (Guerrina, Haastrup, et al., 2018). As such,
we are witnessing the ‘paradox of men’s dominance of
the Brexit campaign and women’s rise in the political cri-
sis’ (Hozić & True, 2017, p. 271). This political moment
thus necessitates closer engagement, drawing on critical
feminism, of the impact of Brexit on the socio-economic
fabric of the country but also Europe more generally.
A number of reports have warned that Brexit jeop-
ardises the political commitment to women’s human
rights protection in the UK (Equality and Human Rights
Commission, 2018). Brexit will also have an impact on
the recourse UK civil society have to inter-European net-
works and funding (Danisi, Dustin, & Ferreira, 2017; Ritch,
2019). This includes UK civil society actors who have
taken an active role in supporting the EU’s engagement
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in gender-sensitive foreign policy through the Women,
Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, for example, the UK
based Gender Advocacy for Peace and Security.
So, the literature clearly indicates that Brexit will
likely have a negative impact on the domestic gender
equality order in the UK if specific guarantees are not
embedded in the Withdrawal Agreement (see Fagan &
Rubery, 2018; Plomien, 2018). However, we know far
less about the implications of Brexit on the EU’s com-
mitments and practices of gender equality, especially
whenwe look beyond the area of social rights. This repre-
sents a significant gap in the literature and speaks to the
fluid nature of Brexit itself (see De Ville & Siles-Brügge,
2019). Examining the impact of the process of Brexit on
the prospects of the EU as a gender equal polity is im-
portant because it contributes to broader discussions
concerning the influence of disintegration and integra-
tion as gendered processes (Lombardo, 2018); gender
equality is after all an important part of the foundational
myths of the EU (MacRae, 2010). Particularly important
is the platform provided by the EU for civil society organ-
isations. National advocacy groups feed into European
wide umbrella organisations, for example, the European
Women’s Lobby and European Peacebuilding Liaison
Office. This allows for sharing of best practice, norm dif-
fusion and informal processes of Europeanisation to take
place (see also Van Eerdewijk & Roggeband, 2014).
To date the negotiations to determine the aftermath
of the UK’s departure from the EU have shown a general
lack of concern for gender equality provisions or acknowl-
edgement of the gendered implications of post-Brexit EU
or UK (Guerrina, 2019). In the throes of Brexit, we see the
lack of consideration for gender as an overarching prior-
ity as indicative of the limitations of recent EU practices.
At the same time, by moving beyond an analysis that lim-
its gender equality to social policies and politics, to en-
gage foreign and security policies, we explore the devel-
opments since June 2016 as indicative of the shape of
the EU’s engagement with gender in the external sphere
in the context of, and after, Brexit (O’Dwyer, 2018).
In the aftermath of the 2016 referendum result that
is intended to deliver Brexit, European institutions have
made specific efforts to better promote the idea of
Europe, its norms, and role in global politics through its
foreign policies and practices. This is evidenced by the
immediate move to implement the Global Strategy soon
after the results (see also Nadibaidze, 2019). The lack
of consensus as to the future of the internal project, in-
creasing efforts to ‘secure’ European external borders,
has gone hand-in-hand with a re-articulation of the or-
ganisation’s core values and its role as an external ac-
tor. Increasing efforts by the EU to consolidate work
on WPS and the Gender Action Plan will be defined
by the Brexit paradox. Whereas the UK has relegated
issues relating to gender and social justice to the bot-
tom of the policy agenda as it seeks to establish itself
as a ‘masculinised’ great power, the EU for its part has
the opportunity to raise the WPS agenda higher up the
policy agenda as it seeks to re-affirm its position as a
normative power in global politics (Guerrina, Haastrup,
et al., 2018; Guerrina &Masselot, 2018; Kronsell, 2016a;
MacLeavy, 2018; Williams, 2017; see also Achilleos-Sarll
& Martill, 2019).
This article develops its analysis in five sections. First,
we show how by drawing on a critical feminist approach
we are able to shed light on theways inwhich gender per-
spectives are (under)deployed as part of the EU’s Brexit
landscape thus far. Subsequently, we look at the con-
text of Brexit to justify our interrogation of this particu-
lar area of policy. While the third section examines the
trajectory of gender equality perspectives in the foreign
policy approaches of the EU and the UK, thus opening
a space for assessing the impact of the relationships be-
tween the UK as a member state and the EU in Section 4.
Finally, in Section 5, we examine post-referendum devel-
opments in the EU focusing on the development of the
Strategic Approach to WPS adopted in December 2018.
We conclude with some preliminary thoughts on what
this (post-) Brexit space may mean for the practices of
an EU common foreign, defence and security policy that
takes gender issues seriously.
2. A Critical Feminist Approach
The literature has thus far established that the EU often
makes claims to be a gender equal polity and a promoter
of gender equality norms abroad. However, it is one
which embodies a neoliberal market logic (Muehlenhoff,
2017). The inclusion of equal rights between men and
women by the EU in the internal sphere was not moti-
vated by feminists concerns of social justice. Rather, the
addition of gender equality was solely motivated by eco-
nomic concerns, specifically to safeguard competition
in the new Common Market (Bain & Masselot, 2012;
Kantola, 2010). It is perhaps unsurprising then that this
functionalist logic has ‘spill-over’ into approaches seek-
ing to integrating gender into foreign and security policy.
Given this context, we do not assume that the way the
EU approaches the inclusion of gender is motivated by
feminist goals. At the same time, we cannot deny the EU
has (at times) had a role in ensuring gender equality re-
mains on the agenda of some of its member states. As
Walby (2004) argues, the EU has been a leader in this
area well ahead of most of its ownmember states. Fagan
and Rubery (2018, p. 298) further note three dimensions
to the EU’s gender equality policy: ‘the gender equal-
ity regulatory framework (hard law), the gender main-
streaming of…policy formation (guidelines and policy
processes) and funding policies (European social funds)’.
In the 1970s the UK’s equalities legislations were directly
prompted by the EU’s hard law proposal. More recently,
soft lawmechanisms such as gender mainstreaming also
influenced New Labour’s progressive agenda especially
in the area of social policy. So, whereas we accept that
the EU is a gender actor, we do not assert that it is a fem-
inist actor.
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In this article, we take an explicit feminist approach
that is critically reflective about what kind of institution
the EU is in order to better understand its processes, and
their implications for different marginalised groups. We
use a critical feminist approach to unpack how the WPS
agenda is being understood by the EU, the role of differ-
ent actors in driving this agenda within the EU. This is
the most appropriate framework because ‘a critical ap-
proach is based in the intentions of the researcher to
transform conditions of inequity and so this stance per-
vades all aspect of the research process’ (Willis et al.,
2008). This then informs the entirety of our contribu-
tion here.
We draw from a tradition of feminism that acknowl-
edges the endemic nature of gender subordination in
society and institutions within it. While gender goes be-
yond women, the construction of gender is often tied
to masculinised and feminised bodies. Critical feminism,
by taking into account the ‘the ideational and mate-
rial manifestations of gendered identity and gendered
power in world politics’ (Sjoberg, 2010, p. 3) helps us
understand the ways in which the feminized is subordi-
nated to the masculinized (see also MacKinnon, 1987).
Moreover, and as Susan Wright notes, a critical feminist
approach takes account of the ‘social, cultural and po-
litical conditions’ (Brexit) under which gender is under-
stood and being done (Wright, 2010, p. 193). Critical fem-
inism in this context further elaborates on the gendered
ways in which the voices of traditionally marginalised
groups and perspectives continue to be silenced from
the Brexit processes (Emejulu, 2016; Haastrup, Wright,
& Guerrina, 2016; Virdee & McGeever, 2017). Such an
approach is all the more salient given, as we highlight,
our own relationship with the institution we are study-
ing as ‘critical friends’. It also informs our approach to
studying it through the use of critical content analysis.
This approach, as one underpinned by feminist praxis,
enables us to grasp the broader implications of Brexit
as a process and the resulting implications for the value
placed on gender in the EU’s approach to foreign pol-
icy. In other words, the article also unpacks how gen-
der is located within the EU’s foreign and security ma-
trix. As critical scholars we do not ‘take the world as
we find it’ as problem-solving approaches do (Cox, 1981,
pp. 128–129). Rather, we call these institutions into
question and account for the possibility of their change
(Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz, 2019, p. 6). In doing so, our
research is normatively guided (Cox, 1981, p. 129).
To date, existing research has shown the tendency of
both the EU, and EU Studiesmore broadly, tomarginalise
gender issues (Guerrina, Haastrup, et al., 2018) outside
of the areas we have identified. Moreover, there has
been very little feminist attention paid to the security di-
mension. Where this has been the case (see Guerrina,
Chappell, & Wright, 2018; Guerrina & Wright, 2016;
Haastrup, 2018; Kronsell, 2016b) an explicit feminist insti-
tutionalist account has been prioritised. However, in the
context of Brexit and while the institutionalist lens pro-
vides useful lessons, it is not particularly useful to apply
here given the ways in which Brexit remains in flux—the
rules of game are not set. Rather, to transform our sub-
ject of study (gender in foreign and security policies) and
understand it in particular contexts (Brexit), we seek to
explicitly politicise and unpick the ways in which inequal-
ities and differences are manifested (Henry, 2018, p. 2).
Ultimately our approach provides an important counter-
narrative tomainstreamanalysis of Brexit and indeed the
EU’s foreign and security policy approach.
As a member state, the UK has been tied to the EU’s
processes. It is thus unsurprising that the EU has had
an important role in shaping the UK’s commitment to
gender equality (Hantrais, 2018). The UK’s entry into the
European Economic Community in January 1973, came
at a time of expansion for gender equality provisions
in the treaties. European legislation has influenced the
development of national equality policies (see Annesley
& Gains, 2013). However, the UK’s implementation of
EU gender norms is not uncontested as we see in the
UK’s preference for de-regulation, limiting the scope of
the 1992 Pregnant Workers’ Directive (Guerrina, 2005).
Overall, given this history, and despite the disentangling
of the legal framework, civil society groups and feminists
organisations expected the principle of gender equality
and some gender sensitivity to be fundamental to the
Brexit process (Guerrina & Masselot, 2018). Specifically,
there was an expectation that gender issues would be in-
cluded in the referendum, post referendum, negotiation
processes and in the context discussions on the UK’s fu-
ture relationshipwith the EU. In particular given both the
UK and EU’s public statements and wider commitment
to the WPS agenda which calls for the mainstreaming of
gender into the realm of foreign policy.
2.1. A Note on Methodology
Drawing on the work ofWright et al. (2019) and Holvikivi
(2019) we position ourselves as researchers as ‘critical
friends’ to the institution we are studying. Our approach
is underpinned by feminist praxis which necessitates us
to engage in ongoing process of reflexivity (Holvikivi,
2019, p. 132; Wright et al., 2019, p. 6). As scholars of
EU foreign policy with gender expertise we have been
invited to meetings in Brussels has and have thus bene-
fited from privileged access and insight into the day-to-
day challenges of doing gender work, and these experi-
ences frame our interpretation of key policy frameworks.
Moreover, as Holvikivi (2019) argues, this makes it dif-
ficult to maintain ‘neat distinctions between researcher
and researched’.
This article brings together a number of different
methodological approaches. We have drawn on our dis-
cussions with individuals located inside and outside the
EU who have been involved in developing the Strategic
Approach, participant observation, including of consulta-
tions on the newWPS action plan at both member state
and EU levels, and critical content analysis of key policy
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documents. Our discussions occurred under conditions
of anonymity and as such we do not directly quote them
here. However, they have proved valuable for identifying
focal points for our analysis more broadly.
A critical approach to content analysis means that
‘the researcher uses a specific critical lens as the frame
from which to develop the research questions and to
select and analyze the texts’ (Short, 2016). In this con-
text, we examined the Withdrawal Agreement and polit-
ical declaration; UK government documents such as the
National Action Plans (NAPs) onWPS; and EUdocuments,
including the Gender Action Plan to formulate questions
to ask of the new EU Strategic Approach to WPS. Where
appropriate, we supplemented these with abbreviated
minutes from meetings. We undertook computer-aided
critical content analysis of the Strategic Approach us-
ing NVivo software. NVivo assists us with creating a sys-
tematic analysis of documents and helps to aid cross-
check coding.
Applying critical content analysis means ‘thinking
with theory’ and differentiates this approach from other
types of textual analysis (Utt & Short, 2018). It means go-
ing further than applying a theoretical framework to an
analysis of content. Rather, the ‘method demands that
authors deeply know, understand, and live the theoret-
ical approaches they are taking up’ (Utt & Short, 2018,
p. 3). In this way theory too becomes part of the whole
research process, rather than as an add on to analyse re-
sults or just to frame research questions.
From themoment that the referendumwas declared,
and campaigning started, many scholars noted the glar-
ing absence and consideration of a gender analysis. In
the first instance, there was the absence of women in
the debates about Brexit. This was obvious in the UK con-
text. This is significant in so far as representationmatters.
Linked to the physical absence of womenwas the neglect
of women’s perspectives on core issues that then came
to dominate the debates: including trade, defence and
security policies, and immigration. When the absence of
women became more noticeable however, much of the
discourse reverted back to those areas where the EU had
showed obvious competence and those traditionally per-
ceived of as lower order ‘soft’ issues: for example, so-
cial policy.
This model of erasure was unfortunately replicated
once negotiations between the UK and the EU com-
menced. For feminist scholars, despite the deeply gen-
dered domain within which Brexit has been taking place,
the importance of inclusion especially the inclusion of
women and other marginalised groups has either been
downgraded or completely ignored. The lack of consid-
eration of gender is relevant for Brexit since the process
has intended outcomes. To what extent are those out-
comes gender-sensitive for the EU? Towhat extent is gen-
der expertise lost due to the impending and eventual
separation at the EU level? None of these essential ques-
tions have been asked thus far. This is particularly signifi-
cant since themost recent crisis, the 2008 financial crisis,
has shown overwhelmingly that government responses
across the Union, and preparations were gendered, with
clear negative implications for women.
In this article, we ask and seek to answer these ques-
tions and within a particular policy, foreign and security
policy. Understandably, the majority of Brexit concerns
have been about the relationship between the UK and
the EU going forward. But as with the UK, there is life af-
ter Brexit for the EU too. The discourse underpinning the
main site of ‘doing’ Brexit so far, the negotiations, em-
phasises ‘deal-making’ as conflictual in nature which has
served to inhibit inclusion of consideration of the gender
impact of Brexit (Achilleos-Sarll & Martill, 2019), includ-
ing on the EU. Moreover, security and defence are taken
for granted as an area of cooperation that will continue
between UK and EU. Significantly however, in parallel to
Brexit, both the UK and EU have reemphasised their com-
mitment to the implementation of the WPS agenda as a
part of foreign policy. In the following section then, we
explore the ways in which the UK within the EU has un-
derstood this nexus between security/defence and gen-
der so as to understand the implications that the process
of leaving has had on the EU’s implementation of this
nexus since the referendum.
3. Gender in Foreign Policy: How Has the UK
Contributed to Europe?
From the UK perspective, the Brexit negotiations have
been underpinned by a narrative promoting Britain’s
assumed global role in the world (Achilleos-Sarll &
Martill, 2019). This has relied on a discourse of mili-
tarism and has emphasised ‘strength, security and global
power’ (Achilleos-Sarll & Martill, 2019). While feminist
researchers see clear gendered implications, this new
global outlook has been treated as gender-neutral. The
UK of course often claims leadership in the area of hu-
man rights that emphasises women’s rights. This has
developed into a projection of a global expertise that
increasingly includes women’s rights as a leitmotif of
its foreign policy practice in recent years. For example,
under Conservative Justine Greening leadership of the
Department for International Development, the ministry
launched the Girls Education Challenge in 2012. This
ambitious multi-year, multi-country program is worth
about 455 million pounds and is a 12-year commitment
by the government to improve educational opportuni-
ties for the most marginalised girls in countries in Africa
and Asia.
Beyond its role in international development, the UK
has become a norm entrepreneur with the Preventing
Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) as part of its
commitment to the globalWPSAgenda. TheWPS agenda
encapsulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1325
adopted in 2000 and the seven follow-up resolutions has
introduced gender concerns to international security. It
calls for both the better participation of women in the
area of peace and security, and also acknowledges they
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are disproportionately impacted by conflict. The adop-
tion of UNSCR 1325 was ground-breaking. Since its adop-
tion states have sought to develop NAPs for the imple-
mentation of the agenda, and the UN and regional or-
ganisations (including the EU) have also sought to sup-
port the implementation of WPS. To date, the UK has
adopted four NAPs and is a penholder for WPS, mean-
ing that it has the informal role of initiating and draft-
ing relevant documents in this policy area within the
UN Security Council, further underscoring this leader-
ship. PSVI was spearheaded by former Foreign Secretary
William Hague. It set in motion an international regime
which has consequences for perpetrators (criminal pros-
ecutions) and survivors (recognition, justice and support;
Davies & True, 2017).
These NAPs tell us something about how, pre-Brexit,
the UK positioned gender issues in its role as an EU
member state. In the first NAP (2006), the UK al-
ready commits to what becomes the PSVI programme.
However, there is no mention at all of the EU. In
the second NAP (2010–2013), the UK commits to en-
couraging ‘the European Commission to build WPS is-
sues into EU Country Strategies and National Indicative
Plans’. It makes the same commitment to support the
Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe. This is
part of its broader multilateral strategy to lead globally
on preventing sexual violence in conflict and building
capacity for women mediators in Europe and beyond.
Further, successive NAPs have shown that the UK does
see its role as amember state of the EU, in promoting the
WPS agenda by leveraging its experiences to develop col-
lective European approaches to WPS implementation.
Since the 2016 Referendum, the UK has continued its
support for the EU’s work on WPS and has been more
visible in this context. For example, in March 2019 the
UK helped to facilitate a high-level conference in Bosnia
Herzegovina on WPS in the Western Balkans (European
Union, 2019). This came about as part of the UK’s
broader efforts to facilitate EU–NATO cooperation, lead-
ing to the EU ‘adopting’ Bosnia Herzegovina to support
its efforts to develop its own WPS strategies. Moreover,
in January 2019 the UK facilitated an EU–NATO–UNwork-
shop in London on preventing sexual exploitation and
abuse (Marinaki, 2019). The UK’s engagement in these
arenas underscores the commitment to multilateral ap-
proaches and engagement through regional security in-
stitutions, including the EU and NATO, specifically on
WPS. It is worth highlighting however that the UK’s ap-
proach to WPS tends towards the valorisation of mili-
tarism. This enthusiasm for leading within NATO, includ-
ing hosting the high-level NATO meeting in December
2019, captures this perfectly. Such an approach to WPS
sits uncomfortably with the WPS agenda more broadly
and seemingly in opposition to the EU, an institution that
discursively at least claims to have a different approach
to security.
In the context of Brexit, the UK is finding its place
again as an international actor. That the UK has sought
to foster engagement between the EU and NATO onWPS
is interesting given obvious implications for European
foreign and security policies. It raises the question of
whether the UK is positioning WPS as an area of com-
mon interest with the EU post-Brexit. We know thatWPS
has been used by other actors as a ‘non-contentious’ is-
sue to foster relationships with otherwise divergent ac-
tors, e.g., Sweden and NATO (Wagnsson, 2011; Wright,
2016), NATO and Japan (Wright et al., 2019). The EU has
also prioritized it in some select partnerships (Haastrup,
2017). It could therefore be used instrumentally to fos-
ter closer UK–EU relations post-Brexit. The next section
will explore the impact of Brexit on the EU’s role as a
global gender actor. In so doing, it draws attention to
the two-way relationship between international organi-
sations and their member states in advancing the WPS
agenda at times of crisis.
4. Gendering EU Foreign & Security Policy:
Brexit Edition
In the EU, the inclusion of gender equality or a gender
perspective into foreign policy or external relations came
via its development policies. In this area, the inclusion of
gender is relatively uncontroversial for the institution. As
analysis of EU practices in these areas have shown gen-
der is understood instrumentally, within a neoliberal con-
text whose primary purpose is to support economic de-
velopment, rather than a goal in andof itself (Debusscher,
2011). Gender perspectives have therefore reinforced,
rather than substantively challenged, the EU’s existing
approach to development.
In the period between 2000 and 2016, where we see
the opportunity to implement the WPS agenda, we ob-
serve that the EU is absent, as a distinct actor, in an
otherwise natural role. Ostensibly then, the UK’s lead-
ership did not galvanise EU level action. It was not un-
til 2008, via the Comprehensive Approach to the EU
Implementation of the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1325 and 1820 onWomen, Peace and Security
and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as Reinforced
by 1820 in the Context of ESDP that the initial link was
made between gender and security policy in the EU con-
text. Overall, we find similar patterns in the field of se-
curity as in development (see Guerrina & Wright, 2016;
Muehlenhoff, 2017).
In 2016 however, just after the Brexit referendum,
the EU set out its updated foreign policy framework via
the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). In it, the EU reiterated its
firm commitment to integrating measures towards gen-
der equality in its foreign and security policies. The mes-
sage is supposed to be clear, that gender issues are essen-
tial to the EU’s foreign policy architecture and practices.
Before 2016, this idea was leveraged in EU external rela-
tions with third parties (see Haastrup, 2017, p. 208). Yet,
how exactly to implement ‘gender’ was always a point of
contestation. Still, the EU has participated with the UN
inmany programmes particularly under the theme of the
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WPS agenda and in 2015, appointed the Principal Advisor
on Gender and on the implementation of UNSCR 1325
on WPS. The commitment in the EUGS thus seemed to
underscore the commitment to integrate gender in the
sphere of foreign and security policy.
However, the framework for implementation, and in-
deed the clear normative position of the EU on gender
and foreign policy, had been absent until the adoption of
the Council Conclusions and Strategic Approach on WPS
in December 2018. This new EU framework builds on
prior commitments and the impetus to implement EUGS
thus representing a significant development. It is also
worth noting that momentum at arriving at these conclu-
sions picked up after the Brexit vote and consequently
we know that UK official participation has been limited
in the process leading up to the Council Conclusions and
Strategic Approach, although UK civil society remains
part of the community of EU civil society organisations in-
volved in the process. In this section, we highlight Brexit
as a critical moment with implications for future EU up-
take of the WPS agenda as a normative framework for
including gender perspectives in its foreign and security
policies. Recalling our critical feminist lenses, it is appar-
ent that whatever successes aremeasured in the context
of development, it is such that the idea of ‘gender equal-
ity’ is deployed instrumentally where the EU already had
leverage globally. Since the referendum and as plans for
further defence and security cooperation have emerged
at the Union, we have also observed the same momen-
tum to develop the WPS agenda further in the EU27
context. We thus perceive the Council Conclusions and
Strategic Approach to WPS as a culmination of efforts at
the EU level to ‘move on’ without the UK contributing as
a member state. It would seem then that Brexit has pro-
vided the opportunity for greater coherence on the part
of the EU (see Zuleeg, 2014).
To illustrate this, we used NVivo to perform text
searches to establish how the Strategic Approach frames
the EU’s (post-)Brexit WPS agenda. This further enables
us to see if there has been a noticeable shift in the ‘new’
EU approach toWPS since the last policy was adopted 10
years previously. The drafting, re-drafting and adoption
of the Strategic Approach has taken place during the pro-
cess of Brexit. Consequently, it is worth evaluating the
extent to which the process of the UK’s departure has im-
pacted on the normative agenda of the WPS framework.
Taking a critical feminist approach, we foregrounded
our analysis in response to a key question: how does
the Strategic Approach represent the WPS agenda? We
identified proxies for gender and conducted a text search
to see how the document understands women, men
or gender in this framework. We included stemmed
words in the search and did not include ‘boys’ or ‘girls’
in our search if there’s already a reference to men
or women. As Table 1 shows, the policy makes signif-
icantly more references to ‘gender’, than to ‘women’
or ‘men’. This could suggest a move to widen the WPS
agenda beyondwomen, and to includewider gender con-
cerns. This represents some, albeit limited, progress in
moving away from a conception of ‘gender as women’
when compared to the earlier Comprehensive Approach
which made 26 references to ‘men’, compared to 191 to
‘women’ (Guerrina & Wright, 2016, p. 309). Moreover,
the Strategic Approach makes only three references to
‘masculinity’ and none to ‘femininity’. All of these refer-
ences are an attempt to define a ‘positive masculinity’ as
one which is ‘non-violent’. This reinforces the notion that
the norm is a violent masculinity. Further, given that ref-
erence is made to women significantly more than it is to
men, implicitly, it appears that gender is still strongly as-
sociatedwithwomenand less on the actual notion of gen-
der relations and therefore gender understood as power.
The WPS agenda has been critiqued for presenting
a false dichotomy of women as victims versus agents of
change. Almost 20 years on from the firstWPS UN resolu-
tionmuch has beenwritten about this (seeMuehlenhoff,
2017; Shepherd, 2011, 2016) and the eight follow-up res-
olutions passed by the Security Council go some way to
ameliorating this concern. It is nevertheless pertinent to
ask whether this shift has been incorporated into pol-
icy by the EU as the UK leaves the EU. Earlier analysis
by Guerrina and Wright (2016, p. 308) suggested the EU
had focused on women’s agency in its early policy en-
gagement with WPS. The Strategic Approach is a length-
ier (74%) and more detailed document than the poli-
cies it replaces adopted in 2008: the Comprehensive
Approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security
Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on WPS (43%) and
the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by
UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP (15%).
We again used critical content analysis to estab-
lish whether these tensions between victim and agent
are ameliorated within the Strategic Approach. This in-
volved manually coding all references to women iden-
tified in the text search of the Strategic Approach. Our
findings (see Table 2) identify that in line with previous
policy on WPS, the EU continues to emphasise women’s
agency over victimhood. As Guerrina and Wright (2016,
p. 308) found, earlier EU policy engagement on WPS
frames women as decision-makers almost 25% more
than as victims (41 references, compared to 31). The
2008 Comprehensive Approach included a focus on
women asmediators and chief negotiations representing
a ‘value added’ approach to representation, withwomen
Table 1. Strategic Approach to WPS.
Gender Women Men Total
Word count Coverage Word count Coverage Word count Coverage Words
341 1.94% 161 0.92% 52 0.30% 17,564
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viewed as a resource for peacebuilding and conflict res-
olution (Guerrina & Wright, 2016, p. 308). The Strategic
Approach takes this a step further as Table 2 shows, with
women framed almost 50% more as agents over victims.
This appears to be a conscious effort with the policy iden-
tifying recognition of ‘women’s agency over victimhood
as a first step to engaging meaningfully and equitably
with women from fragile settings.’
Table 2. Framings of women in the Strategic Approach.
Frame Count
Agents 110
Victims 54
Overall, the Strategic Approach represents significant
progress in the EU’s engagement with WPS. It goes be-
yond some of the essentialising tropes embedded in ear-
lier policy iterations and extends WPS considerations to
include a wide range of applicable areas, including social
media and an emphasis on listening to differentwomen’s
voices. Unsurprisingly, the policy is centred around the
EU’s values. For example, the inclusion of gender equal-
ity in employment policy has mapped onto the EU’s ‘pro-
market-forming activities of the neoliberal governance
structure’ (Young, 2000, p. 77). In foreign policy, this has
translated in a strong focus onwomen’s agency, over con-
sidering their specific needs in conflict and post-conflict
settings (see Table 2).Women’s agency is framed through
the lens of (economic) empowerment, with it justified
as adding value to the overarching policy objectives and
strategy. Women’s empowerment is also contingent and
pursed ‘in accordance with its [the EU’s] values and prin-
ciples’ (Council of the European Union, 2018). We see
again then a focus on ‘women [presented] as neolib-
eral subjects who are responsible for their own eman-
cipation’ (Muehlenhoff, 2017). However, the Strategic
Approach also engaged with more nuanced accounts
of women’s agency, for example, stating that ‘women
should not be presumed to be peacemakers’ (Council
of the European Union, 2018). And while it acknowl-
edges that women are not a homogenous group, and the
EU should actively seek to consult beyond ‘elite urban
women’, a broader critical reading finds these tropes are
not challenged consistently in the policy document and
are in fact reinforced in certain places. These two quotes
from the Strategic Approach are indicative of this:
Women’s meaningful and equitable participation is
both critical for effective prevention policies and their
implementation.
Empowering women as drivers of economic growth
strengthens societal resilience. (Council of the
European Union, 2018)
The EU’s post-Brexit engagement with WPS undoubtedly
represents a significant development on previous policy
iterations. A product of a two-year post-referendum con-
sultation and negotiation that included the experience of
UK actors (including both government officials and civil
society) but mainly focused on the future of the EU27.
It is a more nuanced and reflective policy, and one that
seeks to provide the EU with agency on WPS apart from
its member states. It also highlights the increased confi-
dence of the institutions to develop and take ownership
of this particular policy portfolio.
5. Conclusions
The campaign of the UK to leave the EU has implications
for governance in the EU. Brexit is more than a singu-
lar event but should be understood as a continuous pro-
cess in which EU actors continue to propose and enact
policies with the UK simultaneously present and absent.
De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2019) already refer to this as
the dynamic impact of Brexit. At the same time, as we
show, Brexit as a process has either ignored gender or
taken it for granted in the same way that the future of
security/defence cooperation is approached. By looking
at this together, particularly in light of the EU’s renewed
commitment to gender in its foreign and security policy,
we have examined the extent to which this process can
impact on the ambitions of the EU as a foreign and secu-
rity actor, and a more visible actor in the WPS field. As a
member state of the EU, theUK has shown a specific type
of gender awareness in foreign policy leadership which
it has sought to lead on in the regional context of the EU
and NATO. While some of the UK’s assumptions about
women and gender were replicated at the EU level, there
is also a discursive shift in the post 2016 discourse borne
out in the Strategic Approach. The process of develop-
ing this has not excluded the UK and the possibility of
future cooperation is there. Indeed, both the UK and EU
have used WPS as tool to engage external actors and so
thismight provide one less avenue for friction. Yet, the al-
most complete absence of gender from the Withdrawal
Agreement suggests gender will not form a locus of the
UK–EU’s future relations once the UK has left the Union.
Moreover, this research shows that while there is indi-
cation that the EU has evolved in its understanding of
gender and thus the transformative potential of theWPS
agenda, this is happening in parallel to other develop-
ment in foreign and security policy (see Smith, 2019).
Specifically, as the EUGS makes a call for greater gender
inclusivity, it also does to further defence cooperation
and militarism. Given this state of affairs, the practice of
the EU as a gender foreign and security actor may fall
short of transformation for those impacted by EU poli-
cies post-Brexit.
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